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Abstract: The concepts of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions within incident and 17 
accident reporting processes are well established, and both play a part in safety, as 18 
seen in highly complex accident causation models. Nevertheless, a systematic 19 
understanding of the development of unsafety to its manifestation as incidents is yet 20 
to emerge. Drawing on a large dataset of nearly 4,000 Safety Observation Reports 21 
from a large infrastructure construction project, investigation of the way in which 22 
incidents are categorised is explored and then, via content analysis of a purposive 23 
sample of individual reports, the reality of how the acts and conditions develop, 24 
combine and interrelate is evaluated.  Findings revealed significant inconsistency in 25 
the application of the categorisations of ‘act’ or ‘condition’, and utilisation of the 26 
process to apportion individual blame through ‘unsafe acts’. It can be suggested that 27 
within a construction context there are relatively few precursors that produce unsafe 28 
acts or conditions, and focusing on these in practice would provide greater insights, 29 
enhancing utility without adding significant complexity.  Further understanding of 30 
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how the development of unsafety takes place would enable management to better 31 
use reporting data, such as Safety Observation Reports, in the development and 32 
implementation of focused interventions. 33 
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Introduction 38 
The historical development of occupational health and safety management in 39 
construction has in part dictated its lexicon.  Early focus was on the identification and 40 
mitigation of physical risks within the workplace, through the provision of machine 41 
guards and controls (Lingard and Rowlinson 2005) which led to prescriptive 42 
management approaches that focused on unsafe conditions through mechanistic 43 
regulations. Subsequently, as the number of accidents decreased focus shifted onto 44 
unsafe acts, through approaches such as behaviour-based safety (Lingard and 45 
Rowlinson 2005), goals and feedback programmes, and most recently notions of 46 
safety climate and culture have emerged (Choudhry et al 2007). 47 
A consequence of this ‘language of safety’ is the way it has shaped and even directed 48 
safety management thinking and practice (Sherratt 2016).  Here the area of focus is 49 
that of accident and near-miss reporting , and the legacy of this lexicon can be seen 50 
in the construction of unsafe acts or unsafe conditions as a binary either/or situation.  51 
However, accidents are often highly complex in reality, and to use such a simplistic 52 
dichotomy in reporting and subsequent investigation is likely to limit the learning 53 
potential of an incident.  Indeed, although ‘acts’ have come to the fore in terms of 54 
management focus, evidence has shown that organisational factors are often critical 55 
(Lingard and Rowlinson 2005); whilst Hinze (1996) argued that it is always a 56 
combination of physical conditions and worker actions that is the true cause of 57 
accidents on sites. 58 
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Despite such evidence, unsafe acts and unsafe conditions often remain segregated in 59 
practice, reinforced by the lexicon itself. Accident and near miss reporting seeks to 60 
categorise one or the other, with no potential for overlap.  Academic advances in 61 
accident analysis have led to the development of ever more complex approaches, 62 
grounded in systems thinking and organisational failure models, yet their utility has 63 
been questioned (Hovden et al 2010).  Such models are rarely used in practice, and 64 
would be challenging to apply to near-miss reporting, which is often large scale in 65 
terms of volume, but with relatively little management time available to record, 66 
analyse and act upon them. 67 
‘Unsafety’ can be considered as the condition of being unsafe. While not a common 68 
concept in the field of safety science, it is far from new. Hauer (1992) provides an 69 
attempt to quantify unsafety with an attempt to understand the effect of 70 
interventions on this concept. More recently, Atsuji (2016) provides a much broader 71 
consideration of the term when applied to disasters and accidents. Drawing on a 72 
large database of 3,956 safety observation reports from a large UK infrastructure 73 
construction project the aims of the work presented in this paper are twofold. First is 74 
an attempt to explore empirically the consequences of a dualistic approach to 75 
unsafety and how acts and conditions combine in practice. The second is to 76 
understand the antecedents and precursors of unsafety with the simple premise that 77 
knowing how unsafety develops may allow the introduction of focussed 78 
interventions. 79 
Context 80 
Unsafe Conditions and Unsafe Acts 81 
Early health and safety management was grounded in the elimination of unsafe 82 
working conditions, indeed the earliest UK safety legislation sought to address the 83 
mechanistic problems of exposed mill-gearing in the factories of the industrial 84 
revolution.  Developments in technology brought new hazards and risks into 85 
workplaces, and key concerns were to “… find the technical means to safeguard 86 
machinery, to stop explosions and to prevent structures from collapsing” (Hollnagel 87 
2014:24).   88 
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Within the UK construction industry, unsafe conditions are often addressed through 89 
rigorous legislation, such as that found within Part 4 of the Construction (Design and 90 
Management) Regulations 2015, which sets out amongst other things how stability 91 
of structures must be maintained, how excavations must be managed and how good 92 
order can be kept on sites. 93 
Alongside such unsafe conditions relating to the work space can often be found the 94 
concept of unsafe acts, relating to the behaviour of the people who work there.  This 95 
is not a new concept – processes of human reliability assessment were developed in 96 
the 1980s to fit alongside the already established risk assessment approach to safety 97 
management. As Hollnagel (2014:30) states, “the idea that human error could be 98 
used to explain the occurrence of adverse events was eagerly adopted”.  Application 99 
of cognitive theories enables explanation of such unsafe acts, examples including the 100 
optimism bias, that everything will go right despite risks being taken, the 101 
overconfidence barrier, and the planning fallacy, which results in optimistic 102 
predictions about how long a task will take (Baron et al 2006) which can result in 103 
cutting corners and risk taking when deadlines approach.  More generally, Kletz 104 
(2001) suggested that most unsafe acts were the result of a moment of forgetfulness 105 
or aberration, others the result of errors of judgement, which can also be traced back 106 
to inadequate training or supervision.  Within the construction industry, Rawlinson 107 
and Farrell (2010) observe that a high tolerance to risk taking is evident, allowing 108 
intentional unsafe acts to form part of everyday site life. 109 
A combined approach is to make technology failsafe so unsafe acts cannot lead to an 110 
accident, rather than educate workers through training programmes (Swuste et al 111 
2014), however this is highly problematic within the construction industry, given the 112 
nature of the work.  Indeed, the continuing development of technology within the 113 
workplace has led to increasing complexity and coupling between tasks and 114 
activities, therefore interactions cannot necessarily be fully planned, understood or 115 
anticipated (Leveson 2004).  This is particularly relevant when many different 116 
subcontractors and long supply chains create complex relationships on sites, which 117 
itself has been found to have negative effects on safety (Manu et al 2010).  Although 118 
single failure prevention is often built in to processes and equipment, this means that 119 
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in practice accidents have shifted to more complicated occurrences with two or more 120 
cumulative failures, which are harder to predict and therefore harder to prevent. 121 
(Hollnagel 2004:3). 122 
These ideas of organisational failure (Hollnagel 2004; Hovden et al 2010) and 123 
systemic safety (Dekker 2006) bring together unsafe acts and conditions.  Unsafe acts 124 
have become a symptom of deeper latent problems within projects or organisations, 125 
the management system creating situations, or rather unsafe conditions that can 126 
encourage or even force human errors within certain contexts (Perrow 1999; Dekker 127 
2006).  As Whittingham (2004:34) states, most violations (unsafe acts) also have a 128 
systemic underlying cause that effectively ‘encourages’ them.  For instance, 129 
competitive tendering for work winning (Morton and Ross 2008); and bonus and 130 
payment schemes that encourage speed and risk taking behaviours (Fellows et al 131 
2002; Spanswick 2007) have both been highlighted as unsafe conditions, or latent 132 
safety defects, in industry operations.  However, as Whittingam (2004) argues, 133 
organisations are often unwilling to look too closely at the system faults which 134 
caused the error, and would rather focus on the individual who caused it; 135 
emphasising the unsafe act rather than the systemic cause. 136 
On construction sites, where the workplace is subject to continual changes, different 137 
resources, poor working conditions, tough environments and complex co-ordination 138 
of different trades and subcontractors (Pinto et al 2011), performance variability can 139 
be argued to be a necessity, therefore to isolate and label unsafe acts within such 140 
(potentially unsafe) conditions seems incongruous.  However, this has not stopped 141 
continued focus on unsafe acts, embedded as they are in the historical language of 142 
safety.  Indeed, both acts and conditions, independently and combined in systems 143 
thinking, still hold significant influence on the way accidents, incidents and near 144 
misses are investigated both academically and in practice. 145 
The Influences of Accident and Incident Investigation 146 
Statistics form one of the most prominent safety indicators of an industry, providing 147 
‘evidence’ of safety management in practice.  Accident statistics are themselves 148 
lagging indicators (Hinze et al 2013), and learning from past events is a key process 149 
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for understanding why accidents occur on sites and how future performance can be 150 
improved (Manu et al 2010).  Yet investigations of accident causality have developed 151 
highly complex, and at times rather unfathomable, approaches to investigating 152 
incidents from a variety of underlying theories and approaches.  Indeed, Grabowski 153 
et al noted the panoply of approaches, and that there have been “ … few efforts to 154 
harmonise or synthesise the models and methods” (2009, p1187), resulting in an 155 
incoherent body of work. The accident process itself has also seen development from 156 
linear, causal models, which suggest accidents are simply the sequential result of 157 
technical factors, human error or organisational problems (Hovden et al 2010), to 158 
more complex, integrated approaches.  As Grabowski et al (2009) note, whilst some 159 
accidents will be the result of immediate causes, cascading through an error chain, 160 
others are much more complex with non-linear interdependencies, drawing on 161 
systems thinking for their theoretical foundation. 162 
One of the main goals of accident investigation has been the identification of the 163 
‘root cause’, and consequently the apportioning of blame (Whittingham 2004).  164 
Accidents are seen as evidence of error or failure, through either an unsafe act or the 165 
emergence of an unsafe condition, and therefore accident investigation becomes the 166 
quest to identify the responsible individual behind the error (Dekker 2011).  It can be 167 
argued that this has perpetuated ‘human error’ as a prominent causal factor in 168 
accidents (Whittingham 2004), as the cause becomes easily identifiable as one of 169 
Reason’s (1990) rule, skill and knowledge-based errors or occasional or routine 170 
violations.  Yet the quest for root causes has been challenged on a variety of levels, 171 
not least the potential for over-simplification (Grabowski et al 2009).  Kletz (2001) 172 
suggested that root cause has an air of finality about it, not always helpful, given that 173 
the cause of many construction injuries is actually gravity.  Hollnagel (2004) 174 
suggested that causes are not sought simply for learning, but from desires for 175 
certainty, and the notion we gain knowledge that can be used in future accident 176 
prevention.   177 
Systemic, management and organisational factors have also been identified and 178 
incorporated into accident thinking.  For example, Hollnagel (2004) proposed a 179 
Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) based on the concepts of emergence.  180 
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Ferjencik (2011) discussed the notions of singular causality, general causality, 181 
contextual factors, contributory factors and causal factors in the development of an 182 
Integrated Procedure of Incident Cause Analysis (IPICA).  Leveson (2004:257) went 183 
further than organisational boundaries in suggesting a general form of a model of 184 
socio-technical control which also acknowledges the influences of legislation, 185 
regulations, certifications, and law. 186 
From a practical perspective, this shift to systemic and organisational thinking has 187 
added considerable complexity to the process of accident and incident investigation.  188 
Although it is arguable that a contextual understanding of an accident is a vital part 189 
of its investigation, in order to appreciate the social and technical systems that 190 
surrounded it (Leveson 2004) and enable the development of explanations, rather 191 
than isolated root causes (Hollnagel 2004), it has been questioned whether they 192 
have provided a utilisable fit with the realities of the modern construction workplace 193 
(Hovden et al 2010). Who, one might ask, are the beneficiaries of these theories? 194 
Does the work of the construction safety inspector become easier and more effective 195 
through detailed knowledge of an emergence based accident causality model? Can a 196 
construction worker amend their behaviour through appreciating the difference 197 
between singular and general causality? While the authors don’t claim to know the 198 
answers to these questions, experience suggests that there is the potential for the 199 
level of detail and the interactions of these details to develop incoherence and 200 
impracticality, as they increase in numbers and interrelationships.  Hovden et al 201 
(2010) suggest that this increasing complexity is incompatible within traditional 202 
linear accident models and whether new approaches are needed , exploring non-203 
linear perspectives (Ferjencik 2011), although, as before, this may raise its own 204 
problems, as the representations and communication of such approaches may prove 205 
too complex to practically deliver. 206 
The uptake of more complicated approaches to investigation has been limited, or 207 
only utilised when serious incidents, such as fatalities, occur.  The need for 208 
investigation to support learning, the human desire for categorisation and 209 
management, and the desire to apportion blame where necessary, has arguably 210 
resulted in the reliance on two fundamental root causes previously discussed: unsafe 211 
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act and unsafe conditions.  Nevertheless, in reflecting on the practicalities and 212 
realities of the construction workplace, rather than seeking complexity it is perhaps 213 
this basic approach that should be empirically explored to ascertain its benefits and 214 
limitations, whilst enabling consideration of the relationships between these two 215 
root causes.  216 
Safety Observation Reporting 217 
The cataloguing of safety situations, whether tagged as Safety Observation Reports 218 
(SORs), Near-Miss Reporting, Incident reporting etc., often stems from the desire to 219 
measure the safety ‘status’ of a project. They allow the production of statistics that 220 
are often proudly proclaimed at the entrance to projects, that announce the number 221 
of days or hours worked since the last accident and allow contractors to measure 222 
themselves against industry metrics. They also of course, as Hinze et al (2013) 223 
acknowledge, provide a leading indicator of safety performance 224 
In other contexts, however, safety observations can allow an understanding of good 225 
and poor practice on projects.  Such Safety Observation Programmes not only 226 
provide a pure statistic of leading or lagging safety performance but attempt the 227 
gathering of richer and perhaps more nuanced descriptions of both safety and also of 228 
unsafety that can lead to better interventions. Unfortunately, as Hallowell et al 229 
(2013) report, the potential benefits of proactive safety control is not well explored 230 
in the literature. 231 
Methods 232 
Between March 2013 and July 2014, 3,956 safety observation reports were collected 233 
from a large UK infrastructure construction project (approximate value £800M). For 234 
this dataset any manager or foreman was able to enter details in to an online system 235 
for the attention of the safety department. The person entering the report 236 
categorised it initially as a type of ‘observation’, either an ‘Unsafe Act’ or an ‘Unsafe 237 
Condition’ or as an example of ‘Good Practice’, and subsequently this observation 238 
was allocated to one of 27 different work ‘categories’. A project safety advisor 239 
‘checked’ this categorisation, and could amend it if necessary, potentially dismissing 240 
it as a non-safety issue, or authorising it for further action. The data used in this 241 
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analysis is therefore the verbatim reports created by project personnel and was not 242 
gathered by the researchers.  243 
A mixed methods approach has been used with these data.  Quantitative analysis 244 
was carried out to initially determine the allocation of observations, and then to 245 
establish the relative quantifications of the ascribed categories beneath them.  While 246 
a full content analysis of all the safety observations would reveal more about the 247 
actual practices and nature of activities that resulted in the safety report, it is beyond 248 
the scope of this paper. Therefore a qualitative approach was made to three 249 
categories, considered a purposive sample, which could then be examined in depth, 250 
utilising content analysis (Tonkiss 2004) to develop a taxonomy of the data.  A 251 
taxonomy can reveal the principles underlying a classification, for example Garrett 252 
and Teizer (2009) provided a taxonomy for human error awareness in construction 253 
safety.  Repeated passes of the data enabled the researchers to explore the data 254 
itself and also undertake a process of re-framing, exploring the potential for 255 
alternative categorisations than those originally made, through the lens of the 256 
literature. 257 
Findings and Analysis 258 
Quantitative Analysis 259 
Of the 3,956 safety observation reports, 2,128 were categorised as unsafe 260 
conditions, 697 as unsafe acts and 1,131 as good practice.  Here only ‘unsafety’ is 261 
considered and therefore the ‘good practice’ observations were removed from the 262 
dataset, resulting in 2,825 records.  With just over 75% of the observations 263 
considered to be unsafe conditions these data can be considered surprising – they 264 
imply that the majority of unsafe incidents are derived from situations that are not 265 
influenced by human actions.  However, this may also be a reflection of the 266 
difficulties of observing fluid and momentary acts when compared to static and 267 
unchanging conditions. 268 
A fuller picture of the dataset and of the range of categories to which the reports had 269 
been ascribed can be found in Figure 1, which presents graphically the range of 270 
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categories as assigned beneath the observations of unsafe acts and unsafe 271 
conditions. 272 
In almost all categories it can be seen that the number of unsafe conditions exceeds 273 
the number of unsafe acts, with the exception of ‘behaviour’.  The inclusion of this 274 
category in itself is interesting – it is neither a work type (such as excavations or 275 
lifting) nor an organisational function (such as permits, PPE or welfare).  That there 276 
are any ‘unsafe conditions’ that can be attributed to behaviour is also interesting and 277 
the data overall suggests either misunderstanding in the categorisation of the safety 278 
observations, or is the manifestation of the complexities of incident reporting when 279 
limited to just categorisations.  280 
[Figure 1:   Categorisation of Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Conditions] 281 
  282 
Qualitative Analysis 283 
In order to further explore the data, and these apparent inconsistencies, three of the 284 
categories were explored to investigate the precursor paths to unsafe acts and 285 
unsafe conditions. Initially considered was the “Behaviour” category, with a further 286 
analysis of the “Hot Works” and the “Work at Height” categories. All data are 287 
extracted from the wider dataset with a 114, 22 and 298 records respectively 288 
analysed, a total of n=434 records. To ensure findings were not restricted to just the 289 
initial ‘behavioural’ categorisation data, and to attempt to validate the conclusions,  290 
taxonomies were also prepared for two further categories. The ‘Hot Works’ and the 291 
‘Work at Height’ category were chosen in order to represent different physical 292 
environments, to represent a wider range of observations and, through ‘Work at 293 
Height’, to investigate one of the most prevalent sources of injury in construction, 294 
which presumably suggests one of the most common forms of unsafety. 295 
Behaviour Category 296 
The first to be considered was the “Behaviour” category, chosen as this appeared to 297 
the authors as an unusual tag for a category. All of the other categories were areas of 298 
the project, either physical (e.g. “Excavations”) or process (e.g. “Traffic 299 
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Management”) whereas Behaviour is less of a work area and more of a human 300 
action. The process of this analysis was revealing. In the initial dataset, 48 301 
observations were recorded as unsafe conditions but many of these did not fall 302 
under a definition of situations that were unsafe through non-immediate human 303 
means.  For example, one report suggested that “Welder welding without screen in 304 
internal stair” was reported as an unsafe condition, presumably because the correct 305 
equipment was not present, but in the researchers’ interpretation the lack of a 306 
screen in a particular area should not be the immediate focus; rather the fact that 307 
the welder chose to continue welding without a screen present is itself poor human 308 
judgement and thus an unsafe act.  This consideration of ‘human means’ was used as 309 
a benchmark for classification, while at the same time acknowledging it is arguable 310 
that any classification process is inherently subject to interpretation, as 311 
demonstrated by the data explored here: overall, of the 48 initial such observations 312 
only 5 remained as such following the re-framing process; 90% were changed by the 313 
researchers.  This finding illustrates the complexities involved in deciding at what 314 
point an act, or number of acts, eventually emerges into a condition; these decisions 315 
are inherently subjective. 316 
However, those observations that remained ‘unsafe conditions’ following the re-317 
framing process were still supported by the sub-categorisation of behaviour.  Here, 318 
and to further develop the previous argument, the underlying premise was that an 319 
act had initiated the condition, although the line between them had been drawn at 320 
the level of the categorisation rather than the observation.  For example, the 321 
observation that “road pins for gulley setting out have no protection either place 322 
caps or remove pins”, can be related to behaviour, or rather the omission of the 323 
behaviour to place caps on the pins, but it could also relate specifically to excavation 324 
works.  Although this analysis arguably supports more complex, non-linear and 325 
emergent approaches to analysing safety incidents, given the reliance on acts and 326 
conditions it can be suggested that what would actually be of greater utility would be 327 
a clearly defined and shared understanding of the ‘line’ between acts and 328 
consequentially emergent conditions, integrating this concept of behaviour within it. 329 
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Another notable aspect of these data, revealed by the analytical process, was the 330 
prominence of finger pointing or blaming individuals for their behaviour.  For 331 
example “Safety rep parking vehicle in live traffic route to speak to his supervisor”; 332 
“Security guard not using walkways, challenged and re-routed to walkway” are 333 
clearly identifying individuals with some level of authority.  While many unsafe act 334 
observations report simply the behaviour of an unidentified individual, 37% directly 335 
identify the individual by name or by the company they work for or by the 336 
registration number of their vehicle.  Such data strongly indicates highly complex 337 
social and organisational issues at play that have seeped into the safety observation 338 
process, in part those who create and enforce the policies are readily punished by 339 
others for their violation.  Even where individuals are not named, the desire to lay 340 
blame can be found within the data, a fundamental need in incident reporting as 341 
suggested by Whittingham (2004) and Dekker (2011). 342 
[Figure 2: A taxonomy of the Behaviour category of safety observations] 343 
The prepared taxonomy itself, seen in graphical form in Figure 2, was also of interest; 344 
both behavioural acts and conditions easily assigned to either ‘policy’, ‘procedural’ or 345 
‘equipment’ categorisations, suggesting that a more useful assignment could be 346 
made at a more detailed level within the data, rather than the traditional 347 
act/condition dichotomy.  As the taxonomy developed, ‘deliberate’ and ‘inadvertent’ 348 
also emerged as key categorisations, ‘deliberate’ further supported by notions of 349 
‘shortcuts’ and deliberate violations of procedure.  It should be noted that this 350 
taxonomy, and those presented later, are intended to be examples of the nature of 351 
unsafety antecedents and are not intended as a generalisation for practice use. 352 
Hot Works Category 353 
To ensure these findings were not restricted to just the ‘behavioural’ categorisation 354 
data, and to attempt to validate the conclusions,  taxonomies were also prepared for 355 
two further categories. The ‘Hot Works’ and the ‘Work at Height’ category were 356 
chosen in order to represent different physical environments, to represent a wider 357 
range of observations and, through ‘Work at Height’, to investigate one of the most 358 
prevalent sources of injury in construction, which presumably suggests one of the 359 
most common forms of unsafety.  360 
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The ‘Hot Works’ category  was a much smaller sub-set of the data (n = 22 reports 361 
that were either unsafe act or unsafe condition) than seen in ‘Behaviour’, yet the 362 
same taxonomy categories emerged from these data.  The only category present in 363 
hot works but not in behaviour was ‘missing equipment’.  This is itself of interest, as 364 
it could be suggested that equipment has developed beyond its inherent unsafety, 365 
the initial causes behind historical concerns around unsafe conditions (Hollnagel 366 
2014), and rather it is unsafe acts involving this equipment that have become more 367 
relevant to practice.  The taxonomy for hot works can be seen in Figure 3. 368 
 [Figure 3: A taxonomy of the Hot Works category of safety observations] 369 
In the preparatory process of this second taxonomy, similar observations were made 370 
as for the behaviour category.  Reports again appeared to be incorrectly categorised 371 
as unsafe condition when could be more appropriately labelled unsafe act (50% were 372 
changed) and those that identified individuals or companies and could be considered 373 
‘blame reports’ (27%), though both were not to the same extent as for ‘behaviour’. 374 
Work at Height Category 375 
A final investigation was undertaken on a category with a significantly higher number 376 
of observations (n=298). Once again each observation record was considered in 377 
terms of the type of unsafety identified by the initial observer and then, if necessary, 378 
this was reframed by the researchers. In total it was decided to change 92 records, or 379 
31%, all but three of these being changes from ‘Unsafe Condition’ to ‘Unsafe Act’. For 380 
example, one observation recorded that “Modifications have been carried out to 381 
crane suspended access basket i.e. extra section welded to front” should be 382 
categorised as an Unsafe Condition but to the researchers this was a clear Unsafe 383 
Act. As before, the categorisation can be seen as a reflection of the ‘distance’ 384 
between the Unsafe Condition recorded and the Unsafe Act that led to that 385 
condition. The reframing of unsafety resulted in a total of 58% categorised as an 386 
Unsafe Act with the remaining 42% being Unsafe Conditions.  387 
While almost all observations stem from an unsafe act at some point in the 388 
development of the particular example of unsafety, the decision by the researchers 389 
on which type to reframe it as came down to whether that act took place at the 390 
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location of the actual unsafety. For instance, “Open edges around external 391 
jumpform” was an observation recorded as an Unsafe Condition and this category 392 
was kept as the unsafe act which led to this unsafety was assumed to have occurred 393 
some time before the jumpform was actually used. On the other hand, “Toe-Boards 394 
Missing, Installation of perimeter walkway” was initially categorised as an Unsafe 395 
Condition but was changed by the researchers as it was considered an act of unsafety 396 
occurring at the time of observation.  397 
The graphical taxonomy for ‘Work at Height’ is shown in Figure 4. Four levels of 398 
antecedent categorisation were applied and for the first level an attempt was made 399 
to stay with the same tags as applied to the ‘Behaviour’ and ‘Hot Works’ categories, 400 
i.e. Policies, Equipment and Procedures. Thereafter the precursors and antecedents 401 
changed slightly to reflect the nature of the ‘Work at Height’ unsafety observations, 402 
though many similarities remained.  403 
[Figure 4: A taxonomy of the Work at Height category of safety observations] 404 
For example, Inappropriate Equipment Use, Shortcut, Poor Practice, PPE are 405 
common to both ‘Work at Height’ and ‘Behaviour’, as are the considerations of 406 
whether the unsafety was Inadvertent or Deliberate. But many of the precursor tags 407 
are different – in general it can be seen that most tags in the ‘Work at Height’ 408 
category are physical or situational (for example, Missing Equipment, 409 
Damage/Failure, Design Issue) while those in the ‘Behaviour’ category are indeed 410 
acts of behaviour, such as Texting, Not Following Instructions or Smoking.  411 
All three taxonomies have common elements, however, and an attempt has been 412 
made to draw out in the last or upper level of precursor categorisation an 413 
identification of the behaviour or situation that has eventually led to the observation 414 
of unsafety. In total across all three taxonomies there are seventeen separate 415 
precursors or antecedents to unsafety and it is these that we propose are the focus 416 
of interventions.  417 
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Unsafety Antecedents 418 
The ease with which the same categorisations were identified in the preparation of 419 
both taxonomies suggest there may be a common pattern to how unsafety can be 420 
understood in terms of ‘antecedents’, by which we mean those situations, issues, 421 
aspects and factors of operations and activities which existed before an unsafe act or 422 
unsafe condition occurs. To bring all three taxonomies together, these 423 
categorisations have been combined within the broader considerations of time, as 424 
shown in Figure 5, which essentially ‘flips’ the taxonomies to reflect practice.  425 
Generally, equipment, procedures (and, to a lesser extent, policies) can be identified 426 
as the domain, decisions and triggers the antecedents which are categorised as 427 
either inadvertent or deliberate within the area of activity closest to practice, thus 428 
leading to a state of unsafety either as act or condition.  429 
[Figure 5:   The development of unsafety] 430 
Conclusions 431 
Through content analysis of 434 Safety Observation Reports taken from a larger 432 
dataset of nearly 4,000, a greater understanding of the nature of unsafety as 433 
perceived by those undertaking construction work emerges. The process of analysis 434 
revealed both complexities and subjectivity within the reporting process, and in 435 
certain case an underlying desire to apportion blame.  This raises questions of the 436 
motivation for creating reports; to point fingers, particularly at those in authority, or 437 
to genuinely attempt to improve conditions.  Projects and organisations undertaking 438 
safety reporting of this nature should seek to ensure this does not undermine the 439 
utility of the exercise. 440 
The categorisation of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions was found to be highly 441 
subjective, and likely dependent first on a robust definition of what constitutes an 442 
‘act’ and what a ‘condition’; and secondly on individuals’ interpretation of this 443 
definition.  This was also apparent during the analysis, where the researchers’ 444 
reallocation of categorisations was of course to some extent itself inevitability 445 
subjective, something which adds inherent and inevitable complexity to this type of 446 
research. Many reported unsafe conditions were deemed by the researchers to 447 
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actually be unsafe acts.  In some ways the initial categorisation by site staff is 448 
contrary to the conclusions of Whittingham (2004), who argues that organisations 449 
would rather focus on the error of the individual.  Yet the contextual descriptions of 450 
each observation challenge this further – while many clearly indicate human error, 451 
most unsafe acts were categorised as systemic conditions.  If such labels are to be 452 
used then clearer and objective definitions are needed for consistency of reporting, 453 
to mitigate the subjective nature of the process. 454 
Preparation of taxonomies on three subsets of the overall data enabled a broader 455 
and more detailed understanding of how unsafety develops, and also that this 456 
development was very similar for both acts and conditions. Rather than being 457 
considered as two ends of a single spectrum, they are perhaps instead two artificial 458 
constructs superimposed on a development of unsafety, that has roots in decisions 459 
made either consciously or unconsciously; deliberately or inadvertently.  It is 460 
suggested that further research explore these antecedents in practice, including the 461 
utility of its application to existing reporting processes to ensure its ability to 462 
enhance, rather than over-complicate, existing industry reporting procedures. 463 
 464 
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